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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No. 06-3627
                        
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JONATHAN TAYLOR, 
                    Appellant
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 05-cr-00359-1)
District Judge:  Honorable James T. Giles
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 25, 2008
Before:  McKEE, RENDELL and TASHIMA*, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 14, 2008)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Jonathan Taylor appeals from his conviction for carjacking, carrying a firearm 
__________________
       * Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
Taylor also claims that the District Court failed to properly limit its inquiry during1
cross-examination of him and questioned him regarding his conduct during the
carjacking.  This claim is meritless and does not warrant suppression.  Federal Rule of
Evidence 614 expressly authorizes district courts to “interrogate witnesses.”  Having
taken the stand, Taylor subjected himself to such questioning.
2
during and in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(1), 924(c), and 922(g), respectively, as well as his
sentence of 240 months of imprisonment.  He requests that we vacate his conviction and
sentence and remand for a new trial or re-sentencing.  For the reasons that follow, we will
affirm the conviction and the sentence imposed by the District Court.   
I.  Conviction
On appeal, Taylor argues that his conviction should be vacated both because the
District Court denied his motion to suppress his confession and because the District Court
failed to give his proposed jury instructions.  We disagree.  Because we write for the
parties, we will recite only facts pertinent to this appeal.
A.  Motion to Suppress
Taylor contends that the District Court erred in admitting his confession to police. 
First, he argues that the District Court misunderstood the basis for his suppression
motion.  Second, he contends that his confession was coerced.1
We review the District Court’s refusal to suppress the confession for clear error as
to the underlying facts, but exercise plenary review as to issues of law.  United States v.
3Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1991).
Before trial, Taylor moved to suppress his confession because, he contended, the
statement was not voluntary in that he was promised that, should he make a statement, he
would receive medical care.  At a hearing before the District Court, he testified that after
a chase by the Philadelphia Police, he had been tackled, sprayed with mace, and kicked in
the face.  He claimed that he blacked out several times in the back of the police van and
later that evening in his cell.  Approximately six hours after his arrest, he was taken from
his cell to an interrogation room by Detective James McCullough for an interview.  He
testified that he told McCullough he was in pain and was told he would be taken to the
hospital once he stated to McCullough what had happened.  He also said that another
officer came in and grabbed him by his collar and told him he would be taken to the
hospital if he explained what had happened.  The following morning, Taylor was taken to
the hospital to be examined and x-rayed; he was treated for bruises and given pain
medication.  Although he claimed to have told the doctors that he had blacked-out, the
medical record does not mention it.
Detective McCullough testified that he went to Taylor’s cell to inform him of the
charges that would be brought against him.  He said that when Taylor was told that he
was to be charged with pointing a gun at the police, he denied having done so.  Taylor
then agreed to come to an interrogation room where McCullough read him his rights and
took down his statement.  McCullough testified that he noticed that Taylor had a bruise
4under his eye and a mark on his cheek, but that Taylor did not appear to be in pain or ask
for medicine or to see a doctor.  He stated that he did not tell Taylor that he would not
receive medical care unless he confessed or that he would receive medical care if he did. 
The Court credited McCullough’s testimony, not Taylor’s, and denied the suppression
motion. 
Taylor argues that the District Court mistakenly believed that he objected to the
statement on the ground that he was physically incapable of comprehending his waiver of
constitutional privileges.  Nothing in the record supports his proposition.  Near the
beginning of the hearing, the District Court stated that “[t]he issue is whether or not he
was, in any way, promised anything special or coerced in any way so as to cause him to
make a statement.”  App. Vol. II 8 (emphasis added).  Thus, the District Court properly
understood his objection.
We find no error in the District Court’s denial of Taylor’s motion for suppression. 
We have noted that clear error will rarely be found when a District Court’s determination
about the credibility of witnesses is supported by testimony that is coherent, plausible,
internally consistent, and not contradicted by external evidence.  United States v.
Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 575 (1985)).  Here, there was conflicting testimony between the defendant and
Detective McCullough.  In rendering its decision, the District Court credited the
testimony of Detective McCullough and found Taylor to be incredible.  The District
5Court found that McCullough “did nothing to cause Mr. Taylor to make the statement that
he made, and that there was no promise or need to promise Mr. Taylor anything under the
circumstances because there was no apparent need, no apparent medical emergency, and
there was no request by Mr. Taylor for medical assistance.”  App. Vol. II 77-78.  The
District Court did not commit error in denying Taylor’s suppression motion.
B.  Jury Instruction
Taylor also argues that the District Court erred in declining to deliver his proposed
jury instruction for the conditional intent required for a carjacking conviction.  He
contends that the instruction used by the Court set forth neither the required mens rea nor
the defense’s position as to conditional intent.  We disagree. 
We exercise plenary review in determining “whether the jury instructions stated
the proper legal standard.”  United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2006).  We
review the refusal to give a particular instruction or wording of instructions for abuse of
discretion.  Id.  Reversal is required only when the proposed instruction was “correct, not
substantially covered by the instructions given, and so consequential that the refusal to
give the instruction was prejudicial to the defendant.”  Id. at 651.
For a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, the Government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant “(1) with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm
(2) took a motor vehicle (3) that had been transported, shipped or received in interstate or
foreign commerce (4) from the person or presence of another (5) by force and violence or
6intimidation.”  United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 685 (3d Cir. 1999).  As the
Supreme Court has said, “in a carjacking case in which the driver surrendered or
otherwise lost control over his car without the defendant attempting to inflict, or actually
inflicting, serious bodily harm, Congress’ inclusion of the intent element requires the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant would have at least
attempted to seriously harm or kill the driver if that action had been necessary to
complete the taking of the car.”  Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1999)
(emphasis added).  In Taylor’s case, the Government was required to prove that his intent
was conditional.  
Here, the District Court provided clear and repeated instructions on conditional
intent that properly instructed the jury as to the standard.  Although the District Court
refused to give the defendant’s proposed version of the instruction, the Court stated the
key point of the defense theory numerous times and in several different ways.  For
instance, the District Court instructed the jury that the evidence “has to show [that] the
defendant had the intention of causing death or serious bodily injury if it was necessary to
take the car.  If the evidence in the case falls short of that, then the government hasn’t met
its burden of proof.”  App. Vol. IV 293.  The Court stated the proper legal standard and
did not abuse its discretion in declining to deliver Taylor’s proposed instruction.  Taylor’s
argument that the Court erred in its instructions to the jury therefore fails.
7II.  Sentence
Taylor advances two arguments regarding his sentence: (1) that the District Court
misapprehended its authority to depart downward from the career offender guidelines and
(2) that it failed to address and articulate all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in
imposing the sentence.
At sentencing, Taylor moved for a downward variance from the career offender
guidelines to a sentence of “ten [years] plus something on top of that.”  App. Vol. II 105. 
The District Court initially stated that it did not have the authority to grant a downward
departure.  Id. at 109-10.  It mistakenly stated that it could not depart downward as to the
career offender guideline because of “lack of jurisdiction.”  Id. at 110.  The Court decided
there was no merit to Taylor’s argument because “the mere fact that the offenses in the
past were committed–separate offenses were committed close together, does not make
them a single offense.  They are two separate offenses, and they count the same.”  Id. at
109.  Subsequently, government counsel informed the District Court that it had the
authority and discretion to depart downward from the career offender guidelines under
United States v. Shoupe, 35 F.3d 835 (3d Cir. 1994).  The District Court corrected itself,
saying, “what I found was that even if I had authority, [i]t would not be proper.”  App.
Vol. II 114.  “[B]ecause logically, two crimes are two crimes”, it explained, “[t]he only
fairness is to say the two crimes were two separate crimes.  That’s why I would not
exercise the discretion.”  Id. at 114-15.  Given the correction, the District Court
8committed no error in refusing to depart downward from the career offender guideline.
Having found no procedural error in the District Court’s decision not to depart
downward from the career offender guideline, we review the overall sentence for
reasonableness.  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-63 (2005)).  Contrary to Taylor’s
assertions, the record establishes that the District Court properly considered the factors
found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), complying with this Court’s decision in United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 2006).  Its meaningful consideration of those factors led it
to impose a sentence thirty-one months below the bottom of the applicable guideline
range.  Accordingly, the sentence imposed was reasonable, and Taylor’s challenge to his
sentence fails.
III.  Conclusion
For these reasons, we will uphold the jury’s verdict, and we will affirm the
sentence imposed by the District Court.
